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The discussion about the right of self-defence of states against non-state actors is in
flux. Among the reasons for that could be new types of terrorism and conflicts which
have emerged since the entry into force of the UN Charter. Cross-border impacts
and the number of actors involved have increased significantly. These factors,
combined with the UN Security Council’s inaction and the increasing threat from
terrorist groups, are putting a substantial strain on the system of collective security.
The promising legal answer to this phenomenon – not only for scholars, but also for
states – appears to be the unwilling or unable doctrine.
However, it seems that experts recently (too) generously identify a potential
invocation of the unwilling or unable doctrine in case law: For instance, Christian
Henderson pointed out that India might have relied on unwilling or unable to
justify the February 2019 attacks against Pakistan in the Kashmir Region. In
response, Mary Ellen O’Connell mentioned that the term unwilling or unable was
apparently first used in the context of international law and military force by the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations to support Israel’s hostage rescue operation
at Entebbe, Uganda. Shortly thereafter, Kevin John Heller wrote that the earliest
invocation of the unwilling or unable test could actually be found in the 1970 U.S.
military action by the Nixon administration against Cambodia during the Vietnam
War.
It seems as if both the question of the true origin of the unwilling or unable doctrine
and its support in state practice have become a ‘race to the bottom’. Scholarly
attention, as a matter of fact, is beneficial for international law in many regards:
Teachings of legal scholars are not only subsidiary means for determining rules of
law pursuant to Art. 38 (1) lit. d) of the ICJ-Statute. The 2018 ILC Draft Conclusions
on identification on customary law specify the magnitude of legal writings, which
accordingly “may offer guidance for the determination of the existence and content
of rules of customary international law. This auxiliary role recognizes the value
that teachings may have in collecting and assessing State practice; in identifying
divergences in State practice and the possible absence or development of rules;
and in evaluating the law.” Nonetheless, and without prejudice to the posts above,
doctrinal accuracy is indispensable due to the responsibility academia takes within
the process of emerging rules of customary international law.
Self-defence against a non-state actor is not always self-defence against a non-state
actor: There is a huge variety of different requirements, models and approaches
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to tackle the problem of terrorist threats. Some scholars have developed different
legal constructions outside the scope of Art. 51 UN Charter. Yoram Dinstein (p.
294) for example, introduced the term ’Extraterritorial Law Enforcement’ to describe
the constellation of a non-consensual, cross-border self-defence against non-
state actors within the territory of another state when the host state is unwilling or
unable. Federica Paddeu (pp. 175-224) makes a case for a technical legal distinction
between justification and excuse in international law: While a state can be justified
with regard to the use force against a non-state actor based on Art. 51 UN Charter,
the question of the violation of the sovereignty of the host state is accordingly a
different one. That infringement of sovereignty must be resolved by way of Art. 21 of
the ILC Articles on State Responsibility as an independent body of rules.
However, it is my impression that most scholars discuss this issue within the
regime of Art. 51 UN Charter. In this regard, the question of state attribution is
particularly controversial. Due to the large number of different possibilities of state
involvement in acts of violence by private individuals a likewise remarkable number
of standards of responsibility can be found in literature and case law: It is a crucial
difference whether attribution is based on the Nicaragua-standard (effective control
or substantial involvement) or lower thresholds like the overall control test applied
by the ICTY, aiding or abetting, granting a safe haven, complicity or, finally, being
unwilling or unable (which some consider to de facto eliminate the attribution
criterion). Analysing the functioning of each standard, pinpointing the differences and
elucidating its consequences is predominantly a task of academic writings.
Yet, the difference is not only of a theoretical, merely academic, nature. It rather
gains utmost practical importance when assessing state practice. While Elena
Chachko and Ashley Deeks for example, consider the U.S. Position in the
Afghanistan-Intervention in 2001 as a confirmation of the unwilling or unable
doctrine, the U.S. letter to the Security Council itself stated that there was clear and
compelling information that the Al Qaeda organization, “which is supported by the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks” against the United
States. Doctrinally, there is a significant difference whether the existing Nicaragua-
threshold has potentially been loosened by the reaction of the international
community in the aftermath of the Afghanistan-Intervention due to the U.S. stance,
or whether that practice constitutes a potential precedent of the unwilling or unable
doctrine. The former is based on active participation and awareness of a state. The
latter is based on culpable omission and can lead to forceful actions even though the
host state may not even have knowledge of terrorist activities within its territory.
Doctrinal accuracy is just one of many parameters in need of specification in order
to assess the status lex lata of the unwilling or unable doctrine as precisely as
possible. A closer look at the controversies of the doctrine reveals that the debate is
fuelled by different underlying methodological approaches. Both a general practice
and acceptance of such practice as law (opinio iuris) must be ascertained for the
identification of a new rule of customary international law. This presupposes that
the underlying doctrinal patterns coincide with the respective opinions of states.
Indeed, statements of states, e.g. letters to the Security Council, are seldom very
precise in terms of legal reasoning. However, this should induce cautiousness in
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legal assessments. Otherwise, the amount of academic opinions may cause dilution
of and confusion about the prevailing law – contrary to what it is expected to serve
as.
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